Trial Court’s Jurisdiction over a State Prison Sentence for Inmate Parole Requests when Inmate Transfer Rejected by State DOC and Defendant remains Incarcerated at the County Prison
In a somewhat unusual circumstance in a criminal case, the Law Office of Adam R. Weaver, Esq. was successful on behalf of a client in overturning the Trial Court.
The issue before the Court was whether the Trial Court erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction to grant a Defendant parole from the County Prison when the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) administratively rejected the DC-5B Transfer Request of the County Prison to transfer the Defendant to serve the imposed 1.5 to 5 year state prison Sentence at the State Correctional Institute (“SCI”) on two ungraded misdemeanor drug possession counts and the Defendant remains at the County Prison to serve the remainder of State Prison Sentence at the county prison in lieu of the DOC’s rejection of the inmate transfer request.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court decided in the affirmative that a Trial Court does in fact have jurisdiction to grant parole to a defendant in the County Prison even though that defendant was sentenced to a state prison sentence in the case of Commonwealth v. Tiglio, 2024 Pa. Super 303 (Dec. 18, 2024).
When a defendant is sentenced under Pennsylvania law to a jail sentence, the Trial Court must issue a minimum date and a maximum date in the prison sentence. When total confinement is imposed, the court must state on the record a minimum sentence of confinement no greater than one-half of the maximum sentence. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9762(b)(1). This is commonly referred to a the “mid-max” rule.
After the minimum sentence is served, then a defendant may petition for parole. When parole is granted after a minimum sentence is served, the remainder of a defendant’s maximum sentence is served on parole (similar to probation).
A state prison sentence under Pennsylvania law is a sentence imposed by the Trial Court with a maximum tailend of 2 years or more. A state prison sentence is served at one of the State Correctional Institutions (“SCI”). A county prison sentence is any prison sentence with a maximum tailend sentence of less than two years. A county prison sentence is served at the County Prison Facility in the county where the crime occurred.
A state prison sentence gives the state administration agency, the Department of Corrections “DOC” jurisdiction to parole a defendant from state prison. A county prison sentence gives the county probation office and trial judge the jurisdiction to parole a defendant from the county prison facility.
If the Trial Court was correct on this issue that it lacked jurisdiction to parole, then the Defendant would have to remain incarcerated at the County Prison without the possibility of parole serving the entirety of the 5 year maximum prison sentence at the County level.
The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections has the ability to reject the transfer of a defendant from a county prison pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9762(i), which sets forth that no person sentenced to total conferment shall be committed to the Department of Corrections unless either (1) the aggregate sentence consists of a conviction for an offense graded as a misdemeanor of the second degree or higher, or (2) the Secretary of Corrections or the secretary’s designee has consented to the commitment. Under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9762(j), it sets forth that 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 106(b)(8) and (9) (relating to classes of offenses) applies to subsection (i). Pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 106(b)(9), a crime declared to be a misdemeanor, without specification of degree, is of the third degree.
The above statute means that if the state DOC construes a sentence, even if the maximum sentence is more than 2 years, as a misdemeanor of the 3rd degree, then the DOC has discretion to refuse the transfer to a SCI prison and therefore the defendant has to serve the sentence at a County Prison.
The essential purpose of this statute is to provide for administrative discretion by SCI staff to assist in the inmate population management between state prisons and county prisons.
On Appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, the Defendant argued that Place of Confinement controls who has paroling authority, which Pennsylvania Statute vests that jurisdiction with the Trial Court for a county prison inmate. The State Board of Parole only governs state prison inmates whose place of confinement is at the SCI and does not have paroling authority over the Defendant at the County Prison.
Without the ability to seek parole out of a County Prison and neither County nor State claiming jurisdiction to do so, then a defendant is essentially stuck in the “Upside Down,” belonging neither to State nor County but rather thrust into the “in between” realm. In Netflix’s Stranger Things, a TV series, the “Upside Down” was a name given to describe a mysterious alternate dimension existing in parallel to the human world.
It also creates a Warehouse Approach to inmates as a defendant remains in County Prison until the maximum sentence entirely served, without the ability to obtain work release or furlough while incarcerated in order to engage in re-entry type programs designed for inmates to be reintegrated back into society before they are released from jail.
The rule of statutory construction is not an inviolable commandment to be blindly enforced regardless of surrounding circumstances or the practical results of rigidly applying the text to a given situation. Thorpe v. Borough of Thorpe, 770 F.3d 255, 263-65 (3d. Cir. 2014) (in a lawsuit by an heir to return the body of athlete Jim Thorpe, despite the Borough of Jim Thorpe receiving federal funds to meet the plain statutory definition of “museum” under the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, it would lead to an absurd result and lawsuit dismissed). A plain reading of statute does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable. Harmon v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 207 A.3d 292, 304 (Pa. 2019) (citing 1 Pa.S.C.A. § 1922).
The U.S. Supreme Court has previously held that the Eight Amendment (prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment) of the U.S. Constitution prohibited sentencing juvenile offenders to a life sentence on non-homicide charges without the ability to seek parole in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010) (parole provides a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release”). Likewise, since parole is permitted under Pennsylvania Statute, there is a substantive due process right of the Defendant to have the ability to seek parole. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1979); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972). Under Pennsylvania law, although a prisoner has no liberty interest in parole, he or she does have a substantive due process right “in making sure the [Paroling Authority] followed the minimum duties required by law.” Homa v. Pa.Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 192 A.3d 329, 334 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).
Moreover, legal cases exist whereby a defendant cannot challenge a wide range of policy decisions made by the DOC, through what is commonly referred to as a Writ of Mandamus action. Prison administrators are afforded wide-ranging deference in their adoption and enforcement of policies that are necessary to preserve order, discipline and security in prisons. A prison authority’s adoption of policies and practices creates neither rights in inmates nor a constitutionally protected interest triggering the inmates’ procedural due process protection. O’Toole v. PA Depart. of Corrections, 196 A.3d 260, 266-67 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (inmates challenge to DOC implementation of its SCI policy precluding Timberland boots). It is well settled that procedural due process concerns are implicated only by adjudications, not by state actions that are legislative in character. Small v. Horn, 722 A.2d 664, 671 (Pa. 1998) (prisoner litigation case regarding a request to invalidate the DOC’s revocation of permission to wear civilian clothing); see also Banks v. Department of Corrections, 159 A.2d 432, 433-344 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (writ of mandamus only applies against an agency when it does not comply with the procedural requirements of its own regulations); see also Clark v. Beard, 918 A.2d 155, 159 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007 (mandamus is not used to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion of an official in a particular way); see also DeMaria v. Commonwealth, Case No. 710 M.D. 2018 (Pa. Cmwlth. Oct. 23, 2019) (Unpublished Opinion Oct. 23, 2019) (dismissal of prisoner’s mandamus action regarding DOC’s decision to reject inmate into State Drug Treatment Court). An inmate does not have a right to challenge the administrative transfer among state prison or have a hearing prior to the prison transfer. Robson v. Biester, 53 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 587, 589-90 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980); see also McCray v. Pa. Dept. of Corrections, 872 A.2d 1127, 1131 (Pa. 2005) (where discretionary actions and criteria are not being contested, but rather the actions of the DOC in computing an inmate’s maximum and minimum dates of confinement, an action for mandamus remains a viable as a means for examining whether statutory requirements have been met).
The Appellate Court essentially agreed. Although the court imposed a “state sentence,” Appellant was placed in the county facility under the jurisdiction of the trial court because the DOC declined to accept her into a state institution under Section 9762(i). It therefore was
within the power of the trial court to consider Appellant’s request for parole. a trial court possesses the power to release an inmate on parole if the inmate is in the county correctional institution of that judicial district. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9776(a). Commonwealth v. Tiglio, 2024 Pa. Super 303 (Dec. 18, 2024).
